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Book Reviews 
Haliermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity by Seyla Benhabib and Maur-
izio Passerin d'Entreves. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997. Pp. ix + 305. 
$35.00, cloth; $17.00, paper. 
The Power of Dialogue: Critical Hermeneutics after Gnda1l1er and Foucault by 
Hans Herbert Kogler. Cambridge, MA: MlT Press, 1996. Pp. 322. $35.00. 
The reception of Jiirgen Habermas's work presents a certain paradox. 
Haberrnas is widely recognized as having developed the Illost ambitious and 
fully articulated version of a critical theory of society, one that incorporates 
work from anthropology, linguistics, sociology, and psychoanalysis into a 
framework sensitive to the linguistic turn in philosophy and postempiricist 
currents in tvventieth-century thought. However, his particular formulations 
have attracted a good deal of criticism, and his program for a formal prag-
matics that would replace ideology-critique, as well as his diagnosis of the 
pathologies of modernity as stemming from blocking communication or the 
colonization of the Hfe-world, have inspired little research. In contrast with 
the broad influence of the best-known postvvar French thinkers, Habermas's 
direct influence is mostly limited to the work of close col1eagues and stu-
dents. 
In the culmination of his early work, The Theory of Communicative Actioll, 
Habermas locates the normative foundations of a critical theory in the formal 
conditions of communication, in particular the purported necessity of the at-
tempt to reach mutual understanding. This conception of communicative ac-
tion, and the richer conception of reason associated with it, i11uminate and 
correct Max Weber's pessimism concerning modernity, which was adopted 
by the first generation of critical theorists, such as Max. Horkheimer and 
Theodor Adorno, who for Habermas tacitly modeled reason as such solely 
on instrumental reason, the human appropriation and transformation of na-
ture. The critical resistance to Habermas's program has centered on dissatis-
faction with the claim that appeal to the validity presupposed in each 
communicative act can achieve the goals intended by earlier theorists' ideol-
ogy-critique without reference to concrete social practices, human needs and 
desires, configurations of power, actual social groups, and substantive con-
ceptions of happiness and the good. This rejection of the features of "univer-
sality, ideality, and transcendence" in Habermas's work helps explain the 
resistance of philosophers to his account and the lack of interest in sociology 
and culhtral studies in pursuing research in its terms. 
FolIowing the publication of The Theory of COl11municative Actiol1, Habennas 
broadened his account of modernity from the internal critique of Weber to a 
full-fledged defense of modernity as the uncompleted project of enlighten-
ment, a defense given most fully in The Philosophicnl Discourse of Modemity 
through a critical examination of Hegel, Nietzsche, Batailie, Heidegger, Der-
rida, Foucault, and Castoriadis. For Habermas, Hegel in his Jena period 
gives the best expression of the project of modenlity: human happiness and 
autonomy are to be secured through intersubjective recognition. But Hegel 
in his mature thought spoiled this insight by incorporating it into the frame-
work of an absolutist philosophy of Spirit modeled on the productive s('1£-
externalization and reappropriation of a subject conceived monologically. 
Nietzsche abandons Hegel's insight for the project of radical self-overcoming 
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through an aestheticist cultivation of self-dissolution in ecstatic experience 
and a hermeneutic suspicion toward claims to reason so total as to under-
mine the self-justification of any form of critique. Heidegger reinterprets the 
concept of truth as disclosure and thereby loses the dimension of intersubjec-
tive testing, and so he disengages any disclosure from either rational motiva-
tion or normative justification. 
Habermas finds in each thinker hints of a notion of communicative reason 
that are left undeveloped in favor of a philosophy of the subject that valor-
izes ecstatic self-dissolution in holistic, transsubjective, and uncriticizable 
world-disclosures. The initial orientation toward the philosophy of the sub-
ject, and the confusion of instrumental reason with reason as such, leads to 
increasingly desperate attempts at self-abnegation and orientation to a mys-
terious, indeed ineffable "other" only partially approximated through a 
methodological via negativa. For Habermas, will, Being, the body, nonidenti-
ty, power, and difference are the successive divine names of the mystical 
theology of counter-modernity. 
! I 
The essays collected in Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity 
characteristically make two responses to Hahermas's account. Most try to 
show that Habermas first of all misconstrued the intentions and arguments 
of the philosophical modernists. Where Habermas argues that the mature 
Hegel abandoned the earlier account of ethical totality, and so the concep-
tual framework for a nascent articulation of the normative content of mod-
ernity, in favor of a conception of spirit modeled on the Fichtean positing 
and self-positing subject, Fred Dallmayr counters that spirit is best under-
stood as "a metaphysical or ontolOgical category," not as a super-subject, J 
and thus is best understood as a "dimension" that is presupposed by both 
subjective capacities and objective rational principles, and within which I 
both are reconciled through experience. Both James Sclunidt and Jay Bern-
stein respond to Habermas's charge that Foucault was unable to legitimate 
historical criticisms due to rus reduction of claims of truth to relations of 
power by noting that Foucault's unwillingness to give general grounds for 
criticisms follows from rus insistence that there are no such groundsi criti-
cism is always local and particular. In addition, Bernstein claims that Ha-
bermas, due to his inadequate understanding of the centrality of aesthetic 
concerns in modernity, misses the way in which Foucault, like the other 
thinkers Habermas discusses, relies on techniques and procedures of mod-
ernist art in presenting criticisms through affective imagery, irony, and neg-
ation. Modernist philosophers develop individualized vocabularies, 
imagistic discourses, and irreducibly local and context-specific presentations 
precisely in order to demonstrate the underdetermination of political judg-
ments . by universalistic rules, and to invoke the suppressed dimensions of 
the body, affect, sensuality, and power in modern life. 
As Bernstein's essay shows, the attempt to rescue the modernists' discourse 
of otherness from Habermas's criticisms requires not just an appeal to the 
philosophers' intentions, but also a sketch of an alternative account of philo-
sophical modernity and a diagnosis of Habermas's misprisions from that 
perspective. In his introduction, Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves offers such an 
account, taking up Stephen K. White's influential distinction between theories 
oriented toward explicating responsibility for action and those oriented to-
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ward responsibility for otherness. While the former are guided by the prag-
matic imperatives of collective deliberation on and action toward public 
issues, the latter attempt to recall and preserve the aspects and features of any 
situation that the orientation toward action sets aside. The clearest example of 
such a distinction is between political theories that take distributive justice, as 
opposed to individualizing care, as their focal concern, and deontological ethi-
cal theories of the philosophical modernists, contrasted with those such as 
Emmanuel Levinas's or Knud Logstrup's, which focus on the infinite vulnera-
bility of concrete others. Habermas is clearly more concerned with the former 
political theories, and the modernists from Nietzsche to the present with the 
latter ethical ones. 
In generat Habermas sees modernist philosophers as driven to aporia and 
performative contradictions-between their implicit claims to truth and seri-
ousness on the one hand, and their explicit rejection of the value of truth, ra-
tionality, and reasoned public discussion on the other. His critics, however, 
are willing to grant the modernists a kind of thinking more responsive than 
Habermas's rationalism to the pervasive anomie and alienation in modern 
culture, and more sensitive to the possibility of recognizing subtle patterns 
of domination and the mute claims of otherness. 
What emerges from this sympathetic collective critique of Habermas's re-
construction of philosophical modernity is a near-total rejection of his claim 
to have circumscribed the discourse of otherness by means of a demonstra-
tion of the "inevitable" failures and aporias of a totalizing critique of reason. 
The force of Habermas's critique depends on a prior acceptance of his pro-
gram of formal pragmatics as fully explicating the Hegelian account of the 
partitioned ethical totality as the starting point of critical theory, along with 
an acceptance of the insuperability of distinct value spheres in modernity. 
This does not, however, lead to a complete rejection of Habermas's project, 
for Habermas has uniquely stressed the importance of the Hegelian account 
as a way of explicating the modern demands for freedom, equality, and hap-
piness, and for diagnosing the various inquiries of domination and nonre-
cognition. From his first book, we may recall, he has linked the unfulfilled 
demands of modernity to the tension within institutions between actual pro-
cedures and normative claims. Finally, if his accounts of individual modern-
ist philosophers are partial and inadequate, the force of particular criticisms 
remains. 
A good example of how Habermas's thought can be taken up fruitfully 
can be found in Hans Herbert Kogler's The Power of Dialogue. Kogler at-
tempts to show how the actual practices of the human sciences can embody 
the intentions of critical theory without recourse either to ideology-critique 
or to formal pragmatics. Kogler takes the results of dialogue between mem-
bers of distinct traditions as the best guide to what critique without unre-
deemable transcendental guarantees might accomplish. Kogler cites an 
intuition of the "critical potential freed up through dialogue" expressed by 
Karl Lowith: "Only in conversation does the certain basis of one's own 
discourse freely experience uncertainty through the encounter with the 
discourse of another, and this experience is not replaceable through any kind 
of self-examination or self-critique" (288, n. 14). Cross-cultural dialogue both 
facilitates the bringing to light of one's own unexamined prejudgments, and 
II 
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ties the emergent understanding to the needs, desires, and canons of intelli-
gibility of the interlocutor. The problem of a transcendental grounding of cri-
tique thereby vanishes, and the tendency of critical theory to objectify its 
addresses as cultural dopes is finessed. 
The adoption of the standpoint of critique through dialogue is an ethical 
decision, not the result of theoretical insight, that is motivated by the accept-
ance of something like Habermas's normative content of modernity. It also 
reflects a recognition of the partial incommensurability of non-Western tradi-
tions with Western traditions, as well as the loss of the binding power of tra-
dition in modernity and the de facto internal plurality of Western tradition. 
For Kogler, the framework of this account is supported by a version of Hans-
Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics freed from its orientation toward consensus 
and its unitarist understanding of tradition, supplemented as well by the 
model of local, finite historical critique advanced by Foucault. 
It is in Kogler's superb discussion of Gadamer that the productive influ-
ence of Habcrmas is best seen. Gadamer attempts to explicate hermeneutic 
experience first through his central claim that "Being that is understood is 
language," and then through the characterization of language use as trans-
subjective, in three senses: 1) any particular use of language presupposes a 
holistic background disclosure that can never be fully articulated or a fortiori 
criticized; 2) dialogic language use is fundamentally "egoless" in that it is 
"formally directed toward intersubjectivity" and presupposes a shared 
preunderstanding between interlocutors; and 3) dialogic process is modeled 
on play, wherein language users are absorbed in their roles and mutually 
constitute an event whose meaning is independent of the intentions of any 
participant. Combining these claims with the assumption that dialogue is 
oriented toward consensus, however, Gadamer is unable to explicate the 
sense in which dialogic experience can produce new meaning and new sorts 
of understandings, and not necessarily merely deeper awareness of and con-
sensus on prior disclosed meanings. 
Kogler follows Habermas's criticisms in The Philosophical Discourse of Mod-
emity of Heidegger's reinterpretation of truth as holistic world-disclosure as 
insufficiently acknowledging the possibility of a reflective distancing from 
prior meanings through raising the question of their validity. Having intro-
duced the need to account for the fact of understanding incommensurable 
mezlI1ings through the examples of cross-cultural understanding; descriptions 
such ilS Thomas Kuhn's of massive conceptual change within a tradition; and 
,1esthetic modernism's cultivation of novelty through negation, Kogler can 
de\'l'lop the melhodology of critical dialogue freed from the aporias of ideol-
og~'-crilique or tOlalizing critiques of reason. By understanding the possibil-
it~, of critical self-distancing through the concrete experience of cross-cultural 
dialogue, Kogler can systematically develop Habermas's critique \vithout 
Innn<11 pragmatics. 
'L1kl'n together, these two books develop ways of maintaining the idea of 
a (ktr<1n:-;cendcnt,1lized criticZlI theory in accord with Habermas's attempt to 
ground the theory in poslconvcntional intersubjective structures. Some of the 
prim,1ry .lrC,b of inquiry address the internal difficulties in Habcrmas's ac-
t'(1unL l':,pL'ci.111y his inability to explic<1te the genesis of cultllral meZlnings, 
,md the unCl'rt,1in sl<1tus of modern <lrt in his theory. The former difficulty 
Criticism, Vol. XL, no. 1: Book Reviews 137 
points to the need for inquiry in areas such as the development of substan-
tive conceptions of happiness, justice and the good, with attention to the 
suppression of gender and class. In recent work by Axel Honneth, Nancy 
Fraser, and Jessica Benjamin, in this sense, the outlines of a fulfilled life 
emerge in chiaroscuro from the investigation of social and psychological in-
juries. The latter difficulty is addressed by Jay Bernstein's Adornoesque in-
sight into the way modern art has become the placeholder for otherwise 
forgotten dimensions of freedom and demands for happiness. Such a theory 
need not adopt Habermas's formalism or orientation towards rationality, but 
it could usefully be guided by his ongoing critique of existing practices and 
institutions from the standpoint of the modern promise of an undamaged 
life. 
University of California, Berkeley John Rapko 
Unediting the Renaissance: Shakespeare, Marlowe, Milton by Leah S. Marcus. 
London and New York: Routledge, 1996. Pp. xii + 268. 22 illustrations. $69.95 
(£ 40.00) hardcover; $18.95, paper. 
This is a welcome book. For several years Leah Marcus has been arguing 
-in print, at conferences, and in the classroom-that, following Randall 
McLeod's lead, we "unedit" early modern texts. Here she has put together 
revisions of earlier essays and added new material. The result is a convinc-
ing argument for leaving Renaissance texts just the way they are, thank you 
very much. It is as well an indictment, I think, against post-Enlightenment 
"scientific" thought and the (largely negative) effect it has had on textual 
analysis and literary studies. 
A word of warning. Read the book through. Don't race to the Shakespeare 
or Marlowe chapters, as this might well lead to the conclusion that Marcus's 
book is a gathering of Text A versus Text B essays. It is not. The book pro-
gresses and concludes, and its conclusion turns back upon its beginning and 
demands a reconsideration and reevaluation of all that she has said earlier. 
Marcus opens with an essay on the methods, or pseudo-methods, of post-
Renaissance editorsi she discusses the "blew ey'd hag," Caliban's mother Sy-
croax in The Tempest (Act I, scene 2, TLN 396), and what editors and 
annotators over the years have done with and to those blue eyes. Are they 
dark (and thus evil) circles around the eyes, or might the eyes, flying in the 
face of Petrarchan norms for the ideal woman, actually be blue? If the latter 
obtains, then what are we to make, positive, of those blue eyes? Marcus 
cares less about answering the questions she has posed than about inquiring 
into the methodology of the answers of earlier editors from the eighteenth 
century onwards, editors increasingly situated in their own particular histor-
ical moments and burdened with their own epistemologies. With the New 
Historicism rescuing and redeeming Caliban, can Shakespeare actually have 
meant what he said? 
In her second chapter Marcus takes up "Textual Stability and Ideological 
Difference," using Christopher Marlowe's Doctor Faustus as a case in point. 
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The text or texts of this play present a number of problems. The "A-Text" of 
1604 gives us one play, the "B-Text" of 1616 quite another one. Most editors, 
looking out there for the "ideal" (fat chance) text that Marlowe actually 
wrote, looking for the author's final version/revision/reversion, looking for 
that Platonic model, combine those two texts to give readers a text a closest 
to the author." This involves conflating the two texts, preferring certain lines, 
passages, and scenes in one text over those in the other. But, as Marcus 
argues, "Dr. Faustus was malleable and unfixed from the outset, acted in dif-
ferent 'local' versions which can be correlated with different historical mo-
ments" (41). Marcus takes her key from differing place names in the two 
texts. In the 1604 text Faustus hails from Wertenberg, while in the 1616 text 
he is from Wittenburg. We are so familiar with Wittenburg, "a prominent 
university town, a haven for lingering elements of late-medieval scholasti-
cism but also the intellectual center of Lutheranism" (44) that we assign 
Wertenburg, "well known to English Protestants through its associations 
with the uprisings by radical Zwinglian Protestants during the sixteenth cen-
tury" (45) to nowhere. Thus the" A-Text" associates Faustus with a "German 
duchy that was a hotbed of left-wing Protestantism," while the B-text's Wit-
tenberg was "the center of a more conservative Lutheran orthodoxy" (45). 
Marcus gives us two different plays, two discrete versions, each with its own 
integrity, its own "authority," and its own theology. 
But there is, as Marcus points Qut, a third text among the many editions of 
Dr. Faustus, a quarto of 1663, whose "text shows a consistent pattern of alter-
ation designed to retool the play for a new theatrical and reading audience" 
(62). Here the scene with the Pope (B-text only) has been replaced by a visit 
to the court of Salomaine in Babylon. Different political and theological times 
call for different plays, for variant texts. There is no one Dr. Faustus. There 
are, at least, three. 
Shakespeare suffers more from the need for one pure, "right," "correct" 
text than Marlowe if only because his dramatic output was greater, occasion-
ing a greater number of different texts of the "same" play and because "we 
as a culture demand far greater perfection of Shakespeare than we do of 
Marlowe" (69). Marcus argues in "Purity and Danger in the Modern Edi-
tion" that the first (and "bad") quarto of The Merry Wives of Windsor "needs 
to be considered as distinct from the folio rather than a mere corruption of it, 
and vastly different in terms of its dramatic patterning in ideological func-
tion" (70). In brief, Marcus argues convincingly that the quarto, though a 
mess, appears to be court-hostile, while the folio, more tidy and "correct," 
appears court-friendly. We have two different plays for, presumably, two 
different audiences, and yet the "editorial tradition" insists that there must 
be one text, "the" text. 
In "The Editor as Tamer" Marcus discusses two shrewish texts, the anony-
mous 1594 Taming of a Shrew and the Folio Taming of the Shrew. These are 
two very different texts, the first with lines that sound a lot like Shakespeare 
(and Marlowe), the second (but this may be only because it is in the Folio), 
entirely Shakespearean. Marcus uses feminist and gender criticism to show 
how A Shrew has been surpressed in favor of The Shrew because Katherine's 
taming in the former is far more questionable than it is in the latter. Ferando 
is far less clever than Petruchio. The speech (homily) Katherine (not Kate, for 
-1 
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that is what others, males, call her: "They call me Katherine that do talk of 
me") gives at the end of a A Shrew is religious, not, as in The Shrew, political. 
Marcus suggests "that we start thinking of the different versions of The Tam-
ing of the Shrew intertextually ... to carry Shakespearean studies out of the 
filiative search for a single 'authentic' point of origin and into a discursive 
world in which the authority of the author loses it elan and the work is rec-
ognized as instable, existing as an array of concrete, physical documents 
rather than as that elusive disembodied entity, the work as the author in-
tended it" (124). 
In her discussion of Hamlet, "Bad Taste and Bad Hamlet," Marcus leaves 
Folio Hamlet aside, perhaps at her peril, and concentrates on the "bad" first 
quarto of 1603 and the good/better Hamlet of 1604/1605. Here, focusing on 
the "To be or not to be" soliloquy, she "recasts the discussion about QI Ham-
let entirely by considering that text and its 'betters' in terms of the differing 
expectations created by orality and writing as competing forms of communi-
cation with the Renaissance playhouse" (137). Throughout Ql Hamlet, from 
its opening to the "To be or not to be" soliloquy to Hamlet's last words, she 
finds theological and emotional consistency, quite in tune with Renaissance 
Christian thought but quite out of tune with twentieth-century doubt and 
uncertainty. So too in the theater, where "Q2 frequently doubles back upon 
itself and slows down the action with long meditative speeches, QI Hamlet 
has no time for prolonged meditation and very little time for soliloquies" 
(145). As willing to invent fictions about texts as the next scholar, Marcus of-
fers three narratives about Hamlet. The first features Shakespeare, a young 
playwright in London, trying his hand at a play. The second, using the first, 
features the same playwright becoming dissatisfied with his first Hamlet and 
revising it. Finally, Shakespeare, having "written the true and perfect Copy 
later published as Q2, cuts down Hamlet for performance" (150). Her chapter 
tells us things we don't want to hear, not only about the play(s) but also 
about ourselves and our needs. 
uJohn Milton's Voice/' Marcus' final chapter, is about Milton, to be sure, 
but she sweeps in her old friend Herrick along with Donne and Herbert and 
nondramatic Shakespeare. She takes on those blue-bound Clarendon editions 
of seventeenth-century poets and shows how, in their presentations, they 
deprive readers of a wealth of information, visual and verbal and visual/ 
verbal, available to seventeenth-century readers. Marcus spends a good deal 
of time on the 1645 volume of Milton's poems, where Milton (and Hum-
phrey Moseley, his publisher) place "On the morning of Christ's Nativity" 
first, although there are earlier English poems, seeking to parallel the poet's 
"birth" in print with another, perhaps even more momentous nativity. Oh 
dear. 
Marcus proposes "unediting" the Renaissance "not as a permanent condi-
tion or even as a possible condition, but rather as a process by which we re-
cover and reconsider sixteenth- and seventeenth-century printed materials in 
the uncouth, maladept, confusing, maddeningly or delightfully unstable, 
compelling bodies in which they circulated through their culture and 
reached readers who were part of the same culture" (227). Though preaching 
to a convert, Leah Marcus has reminded me of the many ways one can go af-
ter texts, the variety of approaches we have at our disposal to evaluate texts, 
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and the sheer fun of teasing out and substantiating readings in texts once 
deemed not worth the good paper on which they were printed. 
A final word. I like footnotes a lot. There are none here. But the end notes 
are terrific, even if the nipping forward and back becomes arduous at times. 
Marcus's documentation is full, discursive, and scrupulous. 
St. Lawrence University Thomas L. Berger 
Things of Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England by 
Kim F. Hall. Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. xiii 
+ 319. $42.50, cloth; $17.95, paper. 
Kim Hall begins Things of Darkness with the claim that critics and readers 
have refused to acknowledge that the black/white or dark/light binarism so 
prevalent in early modern English literature is racialized. Hall aims to com-
plement Winthrop Jordan'S survey of the negative meanings of blackness in 
contrast to whiteness and light which opens rus White over Black: American 
Attitudes toward the Negro, and wishes to extend his argument by demon-
strating how" gender concerns are crucially embedded in discourses of race" 
(2). Unlike earlier work which surveyed Africans in Renaissance drama 
(Eldred Jones, 1965; Elliot H. Tokson, 1982), Hall is interested in what I have 
elsewhere termed "rhetorical miscegnation" in "linked oppositionsr espe-
cially of black and wrute" so widespread in Petrarchan lyric, Renaissance 
drama and romance (Shakespeare Reproducedr ed. Howard and OrConnorr 
1987: 144). Hall's is the first book-length study of blackness, colonialism and 
the construction of race in early modern England and follows in the foot-
steps of work done in the eighties, mostly on Shakespeare's Othello (Karen 
Newman, 1987; Martin Orkin, 1987; Ania Loomba, 1989). Though Hall con-
siders some materials that have been mined beforer including George Sesf s 
account of the origins of blackness in Hakluyfs Principal Navigationsr the 
proverb "to wash the Ethiop white," John Pory's English translation of Leo 
Africanus's A Geographical Historic of Africa, Purchas, Raleigh, Jonson's 
Masqlle of Blackness and Shakespeare's Tempest, she also considers a variety of 
less well-known texts such as Abraham Hartwell's A Reporte of the Kingdome 
of COllgo (1597), Richard Eden's translation of Lopez de Gomora, The Decades 
of the Newe Worlde (1555), some lesser known poems of blackness that are 
usefully reprinted in an appendixr several versions of the Cleopatra storyr 
writings by early modern women writers including Wrothr and most inter-
estingly, material culturer particularly jewelry and portraiture. 
The book is divided into five chaptersr on travel narratives and early histo-
ries of Africa, on lyric, particularly the darkl fair dichotomies of the Elizabe-
than sonnet ·vvith emphasis on Sidney'S Astrophel and Stella, on drama, 
particularly Jonson's Masque of Blackness and Shakespeare's Anto11Y and Cleo-
patra and The Tcmpcst, on early modern English women writers and race, and 
a final chapter, the promise of fascinating work to come, on material culture 
and representations of blackness in cameos, miniatures and portraits that in-
clude a black servant. In her readings of English lyric, drama and material 
Criticism, Vol. XL, no. 1: Book Reviews 141 
culture, she argues convincingly that gender is a "primary site for the pro-
duction of blackness" and that "female bodies serve as the testing ground for 
the symbolic boundaries of culture and race" (101). A short epilogue seeks to 
place Hall's project in relation to debates in black feminist criticism about 
methodology, canonicity and essentialism. Hall argues persuasively that 
"black feminist criticism is a methodology rather than a performance of 
blackness" (263), and refuses to make herself "the native informant on race 
in the Renaissance," but nevertheless tends to exclude all but the work of 
women of color in tracing her own critical genealogy-Morrison, Spivak, and 
Loomba. In short, though Hall disavows essentialism, she occasionally enacts 
it at the level of citation and scholarly apparatus. 
This contradiction characterizes not only her methodological discussion, 
but the larger argument of the book which, while claiming to historicize race 
in early modern England continually slips into ahistorical claims about 
blackness and its negative valence. Hall argues for what she terms a strategic 
anachronism (261), but the contradiction remains. If the racialized dark/light 
dichotomy Hall analyzes is produced as a result of colonialism and the de-
velopment of the slave trade, then it cannot mean the same way in Petrarch, 
for example; and what is to be made of the racialized discourse toward the 
Irish that precedes colonial expansion? Such problems are never addressed. 
Equally troubling is Hall's tendency to read the texts she considers in binary 
fashion. Blackness is always read negatively, the opposite of beauty and the 
sign of subjugation, with the result that racism with regard to blackness 
comes to seem ahistorical, always already there. In exposing racism, we 
must beware of, in Derrida's words ("Racism's Last Words"), passing "segre-
gation off as natural-and as the very law of the origin" by insisting on a 
historical specificity that while recognizing a shared vocabulary also distin-
guishes the dark/light dichotomy in Petrarch from that in Sidney, or by al-
lowing that the figure of the black cameo or the submissive black servant 
boy in portraiture may elude the supremacist aims of its owner! wearer 
(Critical Inquiry 12 [1985]). Toni Morrison ends her powerful account of 
whiteness and the literary imagination (Playing in the Dark [1992]) which Hall 
acknowledges as a central text for her political and critical project thus: 
All of us, readers and writers, are bereft when criticism remains too 
polite or too fearful to notice a disrupting darkness before its eyes. (91) 
Hall admirably refuses to ignore that darkness, to see it as merely metaphor-
ical, but in her concern to demonstrate the oppressive force of the black! 
white opposition, she may occlude its disrupting power. The reservations 
expressed here-about essentialism, historical specificity, and a binary read-
ing of the meaning of the dark/light, black/white opposition-are not, of 
course, peculiar to Hall's project but trouble the burgeoning scholarship on 
race and colonialism in literary studies more generally. Things of Darkness 
brings to its reader a host of new materials that make it required reading for 
any teacher of early modern English culture and for scholars interested in 
the historical construction of racial categories and discourse. 
Brown University Karen Newman 
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The Matter of Revolution: Science, Poetry, and Politics in the Age of Milton 
by John Rogers. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. xvi 
+ 257. $39.95. 
John Rogers's book writes a crucial chapter-section in the literary history 
of a notoriously complex and tricky ideologeme: materialism. The specific-
seventeenth-century-materialism in question is called variously religious or 
animist materialisIDr hylozoistic pantheism, or-the term favored by Rogers, 
which I'll now adopt-vitalism: in all variants it involves the belief that soul 
and body, spirit and matter, are indiviSibly one, that spirit is always embod-
ied (thus, in this period, and never or very rarely that it makes no sense to 
use the distinct terms "soul", "body", "spirit", "matter"). The main aims of 
the book are three: 1) to demonstrate that vitalist discourses and ideas were 
prevalent in the middle part of the seventeenth century (c. 1625-75), and that 
they achieved fullest expression, scope, and currency in what he calls the Vi-
talist Moment, which coincided precisely with the years of the English revo-
lution (1649-52); 2) to show that the vitalist idea was, in tendency and fact, 
politically charged-more specifically that it was a liberal or protoliberal 
idea; and 3) to analyze the processing of the idea in specific cultural and lit-
erary texts, tracing in detail the various consequences of its meetings and 
mutual embodiments with other current ideologies and received genres. 
Since these aims are accomplished, one may say that they are also the 
book's great virtues. Rogers certainly shows that there was a great deal of vi-
talism being thought and written, to diverse ends, in the middle years of the 
century, and particularly from 1649 to 1652. Not just translations of the 
chemist-philosophers Jean Baptiste van Helmont and Francis Glisson and a 
spate of native alchemical texts, all vitalist, but a new, animist theory of the 
revolution of the blood and of generation in more mainstream scientific texts 
by William Harvey; not only the remarkable blossoming of an animist-com-
munist social critique in the Digger spokesperson Winstanley, but the vital-
ist-based republicanism of the new state's spokesman, Milton (whose 
conversion to a monistic theory of the soul Rogers plausibly traces to this 
moment); not just the ontology of Cavendish's royalist science but also that 
of Marvell's exquisite, ambivalently parliamentary lyrics: no one, I think, has 
brought the various vitalist discourses together in this way, or demonstrated 
so convincingly that vitalist notions of matter proliferated especially just at 
mid-century. No one has identified the monistic substance as matter of revo-
lution. 
To show that there was a vitalistic boom in the years of the Common-
wealth is not to prove that vitalist ontology was intrinsically revolutionary, 
of course, or indeed forward-looking. Rogers is far from taking its political 
affinities and meanings for granted; his case on this score is impressively 
careful and sophisticated. It is to some extent simply empirical. Most vital-
ists, Rogers says, sided with Parliament through the civil war, and many 
were left of Independency; it was not a mistake that after the Restoration, vi-
talism was marked in the collective memory as a product of Zeal. 
But why should it have worked this way, and been coded thus? Rogers 
does argue for a positive affinity between vitalist ontology and certain posi-
tive (protoliberal and radical) outlooks, or in other words between the key 
I 
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vitalist ideas themselves and certain sociopolitical groupings. Two aspects of 
the vitalist position account for this affinity. First, the collapSing of soul into 
body tended to break or damp down the familiar invidious oppositions, ba-
sic to traditional self-representation, that went along with this distinction-
oppositions betvveen higher and lower, more active and more passive states, 
and so on. Thinking the individual soul in or as or "together with" the body 
tended to refigure human moral agency as a process of inunanent self-mo-
delling. It put both God and Sin at once at a distance, yet brought them in-
side. Thus, as opposed to the various Calvinisms and mechanistic theories-
and it's these that Rogers sees mid-century vitalism as intervening against-
the notion of the material soul empowered the human creature, making it 
seem possible and indeed simply natural for people to "rule themselves," in 
ways and arenas not excluding political ones. 
Second, the equating of spirit with matter tended, it seems, to have had a 
certain homogenizing effect on the individuals conceived as fashioned from 
the new spiritous substance, and so coincided with a renewal, or better a 
threatening literalization of, that perennial, and peremually rhetorical, Chris-
tian egalitarianism according to which the poor peasant woman's soul is 
worth just as much to Jesus as the king's. Vitalism levelled individual sub-
jects, that is, as well as empowering them. Accordingly-so Rogers assumes 
and argues-it was attractive to those groups and individuals who felt them-
selves to represent, and wanted, a freer, more equal species of individuality 
(which is to say a more free and equal polity and society). 
It says something interesting about the revolutionary period, perhaps, and 
about our own moment as well, that Rogers is at pains not to cast vitalism as 
(part of) an "organic" ideology: that is, as a distinctive and definite set upon 
the world provided by members of some new or newly aspiring class, corre-
sponding to, and elaborated on the basis of, the novelty of its life conditions 
and interests. Rogers is making a different, more tentative and limited-in a 
word a more strictly discursive-sort of argument than Tawney made for 
English Puritanism as a capitalist ideology, or, to take a somewhat more per-
tinent example (since he is treating of the origins of liberalism), than C. B. 
Macpherson made for Hobbesian socia-physics and contractualism as assum-
ing the peculiar conceptuality or categorization-of-activity of a market soci-
ety and bourgeoiS life-world. Rogers suggests (p. 22) that the more 
physiological versions of vitalism might have been spurred or propped up 
by the (real and discursive) emergence of a free market, but this remains a 
very minor motive; we are not allowed to forget for long that the originators 
of vitalism were chemists, and the main "theorists" among them (van Hel-
mont, Glisson) foreign, their works Englished during this moment. The chief, 
the really moving event behind vitalist ideas' appeal was political, was the 
revolution itself, though political happenings could have such a strong and 
immediate ontological effect owing to a general discursive condition which 
itself tends to take on the status of an underlying cause in Rogers's argu-
ment. Vitalist philosophy came to seem plausible and urgently exciting be-
cause the political discourses justifying revolution needed bolstering from 
other discursive spheres. But even had there been a strong republican tradi-
tion in Britain (Rogers more or less assumes, I believe, that there was not), 
the continuing habit and prestige of analogy in this premodern period would 
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have made such bolstering, consisting of the discovery of "republican-liber-
al" models of (relatively autonomous) agency and (relatively egalitarian) or-
ganization in other fields, imperative. Vitalism, we might say then, was an 
organic ideology in the sense of limning in the necessary assumptions, not of 
a class, but of a historical moment, that in which the revolution happens 
and, the country finding itself (becoming) republican, attempts to resituate 
itself appropriately within the analogical matrix so that all coherence not be 
gone. Thus it is that Rogers can account, in what for me is one of the 
triumphs of his argument, for the tenacious and manifestly anxious subscrip-
tion, against their best aristocratic instincts, of the royalist scientists Harvey 
and Cavendish to vitalist ontologies. 
Yet this pragmatic, "discursivist" explanation, it seems to me, leads also to 
some less satisfactory analyses and emphases. I am thinking especially of the 
last chapter, in which Rogers asks why, not vitalist, but Hobbesian mechan-
istic materialism came to serve as the ontological basis for British liberalism. 
He frames the question in such a way as to suggest a conventionalist version 
of Macpherson's argument. VVhether or no Hobbes's basic tenets reflected 
deep-bourgeois assumptions "from the first," it carne over time to seem that 
way, to be in fact the case, as the tradition of political liberalism established 
and consolidated itself. Things might have been otherwise, it's implied; vital-
ism might have won out and come to underpin liberal political principles, 
thereby becoming organic itself and yielding a kinder, better liberalism. This 
alternate scenario didn't-couldn't-materializer Rogers suggests, because 
vitalism had a fatal flaw which rendered it incapable of being coherently 
figured, an internal failing plainly witnessed by its literary expressions even 
in its moment. This flaw consisted in its being really egaHtarian in its impli-
cations-impossibly egalitarian, or at least too much and too vaguely so, 
Rogers implies. 
My reservations concerning this argument don't have so much to do with 
the readings which Rogers offers to sustain, though there does appear what 
may be a telltale drift in the direction of allegorical interpretation (wherein, 
for exampler in what seems to me the one really implausible reading in the 
whole book, the faun of Marvell's "Nymph Complaining" becomes a figure 
for vitalism, and the poem an elegy for the vitalist moment itself). My mis-
givings have rather to do with the type and degree of agency attributed to 
ideas here, which seems somewhat inconsistent when it is not somewhat ex-
orbitant. Rogers's rhetoric suggests that there was something somehow lack-
ing in the various vitaHst discourses themselves, some elusive promise of 
coherence that they failed to realize; yet he straightforwardly acknowledges, 
at the end of this chapter, that they were simply too radical to articulate the 
hegemonic values of the men of property who to some extent made, to some 
extent captured, the revolution. If vitalism was too egalitarian to serve as a 
coherent sub tending liberal ideology in its moment and wasn't brought back 
later to serve this functionr perhaps that was because it wasn't compatible 
with liberalism-wasn't a protoliberal ideology at all, or at least (and Rogers 
sometimes suggests as much) not in the main. VVhy should this be seen as a 
tragedy? 
Whatever the ultimate explanatory value of the book's discursivism, it 
does not prevent a meticulous and subtle attention to matters of literary 
r 
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form. Rogers avoids the problems generally associated with the literary his-
tory of ideas and discourses, as it seems to me, by focussing on the relation 
between (religious or natural-philosophical) discourse and literary figuration 
or form, and assuming the symptomatic or overdetermined character of this 
relation. Though Rogers's chapters are remarkably coherent with one another 
in approach and tenor, they are too dense and varied to permit more than 
the barest of summaries here. They move chronologically, so that one comes 
away with some sense, appropriately tricky, of vitalist ontology's historical 
winning through and losing out. This sense will not come through in the fol-
lowing summary; nor that the specific readings and arguments are unfail-
ingly provocative; nor that they are usually convincing. In chapter one, 
Rogers considers the implications of the incursion of a vitalistic explanation 
for the circulation of the blood into Harvey's reissue of his famous theory in 
1649 (in a text titled Of the Circulation of the Blood; the theory had first been 
published, in Of the Motion of the Heart, in 1628). Chapters two and three pro-
vide an unexpected and original view of Marvell as a lyricist of vitalism, ar-
rived at by way of a comparison with Winstanley. Four and five show how 
Milton's monistic materialism informs and distorts the narrative representa-
tion of Creation and Fall, respectively, in Paradise Lost. Chapter Six returns to 
natural philosophy, and argues that Margaret Cavendish, in her scientific 
writings, turns the doctrine of spiritualized matter into an antipatriarchal 
principle, using it as the chief support for a feminist politics. 
As an authoritative treatment of the cultural significance of religious mate-
rialism in the middle part of the seventeenth century, this intelligent and 
useful study assumes a place alongside two very different books, Christo-
pher Hill's The World Turned Upside Down (1972) and Stephen Fallon's Milton 
among the Philosophers (1991). It deserves to be widely read. 
Loyola University-Chicago Christopher Kendrick 
Gray Agonistes: Thomas Gray mid Masculine Friendship by Robert F. Gleckner. 
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Pp. x 
+ 231. $45.00. 
With Gray Agonistes: Thomas Gray and Masculine Friendship, Robert F. 
Gleckner takes up anew the issues of poetic influence and agon that have oc-
cupied the better part of his career. His last monograph, Blake and Spenser 
(1985), his "Joyce's Blake: Paths of Influence" (William Blake and the Modems, 
1982), his earlier article in the pages of this journal, "Blake, Gray, and the il-
lustrations" (1977), and his still justly respected The Piper and the Bard: A 
Study of William Blake (1957), indicate the abiding strength of Gleckner's in-
terest in what he has long called "Significant a11usion." In this his most re-
cent book Gleckner defines the "notion" as allusion "reasonably verifiable by 
the total thrust of the poem into which it has been imported as evoking its 
original context, not merely its dictional felicitousness or even its linguistic 
appropriateness to that poem's general tenor or subject" (154). In Blake and 
Spenser, Gleckner's introductory discussion of Blake's illustrations to Gray's 
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Poems presented Blake as the model artist whose agonistic relation to Spen-
ser provided that kind of fertile "melange" of "significant allusions" to 
which Gleckner has persistently addressed his energy and learning. Gray, at 
the time, was of less interest: "From the pattern of his allusions to Spenser as 
well as to other poets, contemporary and early, it is clear that Gray's pur-
pose in such allusions ... was to incorporate in his own poetry Ie mot juste, 
what was ne'er so well expressed ... " (Blake and Spenser 13). Now, however, 
Gray's "brilliant poetic and allusional strategies" (8) and "allusive depths" 
(185) reveal to Gleckner's keen eye a subtextual double narrative of agon 
and anxiety in Gray's "relationships" with Milton and Richard West. Gray 
Agonistes thus represents both a logical step in Gleckner's career and the wel-
come fruition of that exciting strain of historicist Gray criticism advanced by 
Raymond Bentman, George Haggerty, Jean Hagstrum, Wallace Jackson, Su-
vir Kaul, and, to a certain extent, G. S. Rousseau. 
This is a book with a story to tell, and Gleckner is candid about the nature 
of his endeavor: "I am not unwilling that what follows be received as some-
thing like a psychobiography" (16). His italics are apt, since Gray Agonistes is 
in fact a satisfying piece of criticism that combines impressive scholarship 
with tightly focused-sometimes overly so-dose readings. But its aim is 
less to leave readers with new interpretations of individual poems than to 
offer a new understanding of the poet and his career: "my intention [is] to il-
luminate not so much Gray's life as Gray's life in his poetry, not so much 
Gray as man but Gray as poet seeing himself as a man, not so much Gray's 
psyche as his imaginative reflections and representations of that psyche in 
the poetry, of which it is fundamentally constitutive" (16). Despite these 
early distinctions, Gray Agonistes often does attempt to see into the emotional 
life of "Gray as man," and the title, taken from Hagstrum's "Gray's Sensibili-
ty" -"The true man was Gray Agonistes" -suggests the critical character of 
the-project. Gleckner consequently "eschew[s] an elaborate skein of theoreti-
cal underpinnings from Freud or Foucault or Lacan or lrigaray or Kristeva-
or from other related, oft-quoted authorities" (16), and the result is a some-
times frustrating, sometimes refreshing, biographical rhetoric that produces a 
rich analysis of Gray's career in light of what Gleckner's supple intellect has 
come to understand of Gray's agonistic poetic and epistolary writings, his 
conflicted narratives of personal and poetic hopes and fears. 
The story that emerges from Gray's poems and letters is thus "a double 
narrative of interlocking 'personal histories': (1) his heroic engagement with 
the reigning power of Milton's achievement and with his precedential model 
for a literary career, both fueling Gray's drive toward the status of Poet in 
his own right, not of mere Miltonic imitator; and (2) his equally heroic strug-
gle to come to terms with his own sexuality, with his love for West, with his 
all-absorbing grief at West's early death, and finally with his late-life love of, 
and abandonment by, Bonstetten" (7). FollOWing the introduction, the book 
accordingly sets out "The Miltonic Background," as Chapter 2 is called, fol-
lowed by two chapters on Gray's relationship with West, their correspond-
ence, and the meaning of the Quadruple Alliance during and after the edenic 
Eton days: "Gray, West, and Epistolary Encoding" and "Gray, West, Wal-
pole, and the Letters." Having set up this dual structure, Gleckner then in 
four consecutive chapters ("The Poems" I, II, ill, and IV) takes the reader 
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through Gray's career as it is constituted by the \vays in \vhich Gray's t·wo 
personal narratives "interlock, intersect, interanimate with, even at times 
serve as surrogates (or metonymies) for, each other" (8). 
Gleckner's challenge in reading Gray's career through these two narratives 
is to bring them together convincingly, and in this he succeeds admirably. I 
will offer the barest of sketches to illustrate the kind af synthesis he is able to 
craft through the explication of Gray's allusions. According to Gleckner, 
Gray was almost unique in the mid-eighteenth century for his recognition of 
the "satanic" nature of Milton's intention in Paradise Lost "with no middle 
flight. . to soar / Above th' Aonian mount" in pursuit of "Things unat-
tempted yet in prose or rhyme." "Up led by thee," Miltan invokes his heav-
enly muse Urania at the beginning of Book 7, "Into the heav'n of heav'ns I 
have presumed ... " (12-13). At the end of The Progress of Poesy, a poem in 
which Gleckner demonstrates the parallels between Gray's portrait of Milton 
and Milton's portrait of God in Book 3, Dryden's "less presumptuous" verse, 
while celebrated, is all but dismissed as a vehicle worthy to succeed Milton's 
achievement. Gray himself, the "daring spirit" of the final stanza, will osten-
sibly follow Milton's ambitious ascent: "Yet shall he mount, and keep his 
distant way / Beyond the limits af a vulgar fate" (121-22). But the poem 
"waffles uncertainly" (36) betvveen MHtonic daring and the lesser presump-
tion of Dryden, settling finally if temporarily on Gray's vague and middling 
"distant way," a way that would collapse in Gray's final encounter with Mil-
ton's ghost at the end of The Bard. The Miltonic sublime for Gray, then, is 
more than a matter of a style to be imitated; it is a presumptuous transgres-
sion for which, in The Progress of Poesy, Milton is anxiously rejected and re-
compensed with blindness: "He saw; but blasted with excess of light, / 
Closed his eyes in endless night" (101-2), and it is this last phrase Gray uses 
to describe Milton, a phrase in fact written by West, that will serve to illus-
trate Gleckner's method. 
If Gray's ambition to fo11O\v Milton is both dangerous and transgressive-
"as God and heaven were to Milton, so Milton and poetic immortality were 
ta Gray" (28)-equally so is the subtextual subject of Gray's attempts to sing 
with Milton's voice, his homosexual love for \!\Iest and his extended mourn-
ing over \Vest's death. 1n \Vest's Ad Amicos, which West sent to Gray in a let-
ter dated July 4, 1737-"unquestionably a turning point in Gray's life" (68)-
\'\'est prophesies his own approaching end. Concluding, West solaces himself 
with the elegiac reflection that his parting soul could yet cast one "longing 
ling'ring look behind" to "some fond breast," Gray's: "Yet sOl11e there are 
(ere spent my vital days) / \Vithin whose breasts my tomb r wish to r<lise" 
(Corrc;;l'ol/{icllct' of Tholl1as Gray 64). The parenthetic remark, however, was 
not \Vcst's but Gray's; \Vest's original phrase, "ere sunk in endless night," 
Gr.1Y replaced with "ere spent my \·ital days" (<lltering the next line as well) 
long <lfter he transcribed the origin<ll poem into his commonplace book, sav-
ing \Vest's words for l'vlilton's blindness in Thc Progrc55 of POC5Y and for his 
own ending in Tile Rard years later: "Deep in the roaring tide he sunk [;11-
(ered later to "plung'd"J to endless night." According to Cleckner's narra-
ti\'c, this allusive "finishing" (the title of Gleckner's Conclusion) t(l 1'111' Hard 
\\'.1S <lisp the figurative finishing to Grav's i\liltnnic C<lrcer, ,1n ,1dmi..;"ioll of 
(,lilufC th.lt led to no pilstufes ncw bu·' rather to his "abortivt' fnfay inln 
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Welsh and Norse antiquarianism" (158). As Milton's transgression blasted 
his sight, closing his eyes "in endless night," Gray's curtailed relationship 
with West sunk Gray into an endless night of mourning, announced in The 
Bard by the poet's final fatal plunge. Gray's poems, then, only refigure 
West's prophetic wish and Milton's satanic trespass, making of Gray the 
tomb in which lie both his transgressive but failed ambitions, to be a Mil-
tonic-inspired poet (Gray settles for a series of "middle flights") and to love 
West (Gray can only "fruitless mourn to him, that cannot hear"). Gleckner's 
Gray, then, can only be excavated by attending to the subtextual narratives 
Gray simultaneously revealed and obscured through careful encoding and 
demandingly significant allusions. 
At times, the Gray of the Miltonic sublime as the true Gray-the most 
meaningful and interesting-is hard to accept, and when we are told that 
what is remarkable about the Favourite Cat ode is "Gray's extraordinary suc-
cess in deflecting our attention from his personal poetic agon" (157), his suc-
cess seems extraordinary indeed. Gleckner's analysis of the ElegIj (126-33), in 
particular, is so "sharply focused" (132) as to exclude any mention of the 
"rude forefathers of the hamlet" who are in fact "each in his narrow cell for 
ever laid." Gleckner replaces them with West, too firmly accommodating the 
poem to his thesis: Gray's line 21, "For them no more the blazing hearth 
shall burn," becomes Gray Agonistes' "For [him 1 no more the blazing hearth 
shall burn" (129). 
But Cleckner's narrative of Gray's career remains for the most part persua-
sive. Because of its intricacy and erudition, Gray Agonistes will be of interest 
primarily to Gray scholars and Miltonists, but its candid and rigorous exami-
nation of Gray's sexual anxieties and milieu will prove engaging to all stu-
dents of the eighteenth century, of the history of sexuality, and of the poetics 
of (auto)biographical writing. 
University of Pennsylvania Daniel E. White 
Fantastic Modernity: Dialectical Readings in Romanticism and Theory by Orrin 
N. C. Wang. Baltimore: The Jolms Hopkins University Press, 1996. Pp. x 
+ 232. $38.50. 
Romanticist criticism has been in a reflexive mode lately: some of its 
strongest and most prominent scholars have been devoting a good deal of 
their energies to writing metacritical essays about the state of the field. How 
to explain Romantic studies' recent preoccupation with itself? And how 
might we in turn reflect on this moment, sorting out the unproductively self-
conscious critical stutter from forms of meta commentary that genuinely help 
us understand where we are? In Fantastic Modernity, Orrin Wang admirably 
addresses these and other questions. He argues that twentieth-century Ro-
mantic studies-and especially those of the last twenty years-have always 
constituted even if only implicitly a highly self-reflexive discourse; one of 
the central goals of his book is to explore why and how the field of Romanti-
cism especially bears tl1is burden. Thus this is a book which should be ex-
1-
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tremely interesting not only to all scholars of the Romantic period, but also 
to all persons interested in the history and politics of recent literary theory 
and criticism. 
Wang situates Romanticist criticism's reflexivity within its dialogue with 
postmodernism, investigating the ways in which contemporary critics recon-
figure Romantic texts n as the primal scene for their own postmodem theory" 
(6). (It should be pointed out that Wang sometimes uses "postmodernism" 
somewhat restrictively to indicate the world of poststructuralist literary 
theory, and sometimes to indicate a more broadly theorized social or cultural 
postrnodern "condition".) He proposes that the relationship between Roman-
ticism and postmodernism may become intelligible if we focus on both dis-
courses' orientation towards the notion of modernity, a notion which, he 
argues, has for both a central and ineluctably fantastic quality. The concept 
of modernity holds out the possibilities of both historical identity and histor-
ical difference, possibilities that are always shifting and heterogenous. So, for 
example, while we have traditionally understood Romanticism as a move-
ment completely bound up with a sense of its own newness and of its role in 
forging radical cultural change, we have also come to understand it as 
deeply skeptical of such claims. Postrnodemism's relation to the modern is 
of course always vexed, as it projects modernity as that from which it radi-
cally breaks, a modernity it defines variously and differentially in relation to 
Enlightenment or Romanticism. In some versions, moreover, the postmodern 
condition represents an epistemological and ontological rupture with the 
very kind of historical thinking that grounds the notion of the modern. By 
demonstrating modernity's unstable, fantastic, ever-vanishing nature within 
and between Romanticism and postmodernism, Wang pinpoints the lTIoden1 
as that which is both disruptive to and yet constitutive of historical under-
standing. 
What emerges from Fantastic Modernity is not a totalizing view of either 
postmodernism or Romanticism, but rather the particularities of a number of 
specific and often contradictory engagements, worked out through a series of 
chapters that pair Romantic writers with contemporary thinkers. Wang reads 
de Man with Shelley, Bloom with Emerson, feminist Romanticists with Woll-
stonecraft, McGarm with Heine, Jameson with Keats. Methodologically, he is 
self-aware about what it means to focus on such "representative" figures: he 
seeks to track the dialectic through which contemporary critic and romantic 
writer constitute and "mutually transform each other" (9). 
The book is also methodologically attuned to the ways in which the les-
sons of historicism and the lessons of deconstructive reading might address 
each other. The chapter on the methodological and political contours of Ro-
manticist New Historicism, for example, tracks through McGann's Romantic 
Ideology "the sublimity of a historical error that underwrites historical knowl-
edge" (105). Wang sees historical knowledge, that is, as approachable only 
through error: lithe possibility of historical difference operates as an aporia of 
historical thought, a condition that testifies to the radical indeterminacy of 
historical difference as a stable form of human truth" (3); but error is also the 
condition of possibility of historical thinking at all. In the case of The Roman-
tic IdeologtJ, Wang focuses on the consequences of McGann's misidentification 
of his historical project with that of Heinrich Heine, a misidentification that 
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exposes McGann's ambivalent relationship to Marxism, the conflicts between 
rus various "materialisms," and the recalcitrance of what Wang sees as 
McGann's "covert" or "uninterrogated" commitment to an "emancipatory 
Romanticism" (81). By exploring Romanticist New Historicism's often un-
acknowledged allegiances to particular versions of the past and present, its 
allegiance to an Enlightenment "modernity" and an attendant "progressive 
futurity" (104), Wang is able to identify some of its theoretical weaknesses 
and symptomatic moves. 
Wang's dialectic between historical and rhetorical reading is in evidence as 
well in his ambitious chapter on de Man. Here, he reads "Shelley Disfig-
ured" with "The Triumph of Life," using Shelley's poem to tackle the politi-
cal context of de Man's extraordinary essay-and by extension the whole 
controversy about the relationship of de Man's writing to the grim "modern-
ity" of fascism. Wang's approach to this topic (which is contextualized by an 
illuminating discussion, in the preceding chapter, of A. O. Lovejoy and Leo 
Spitzer's 1940's debate about the relations among Romanticism, fascism, and 
cultural transmission: these are not new issues to Romantic shldies) is in-
flected by his book's persistent interest in the relationship between theory 
and practice, or the correspondence between words and deeds, thought and 
action. He argues that the historical significance of de Man's take on these 
matters in "Shelley Disfigured" depends on restoring to Shelley's poem a 
sense of the politics that lie behind "The Triumph of Life's-and by exten-
sion de Man's-radical skepticism. Focusing on the presence of both Rous-
seau and (ingeniously but less convincingly) Edmund Burke in the poem, he 
reads "Triumph" as a profoundly post-Enlightenment and post-Napoleonic 
document, ambivalent about the possibility of revolutionary rupture, and 
critical precisely of revolutionary gestures that forget their own rhetoricity, 
that assume an easy transition from words to deeds. This, according to 
Wang, is the lesson "Triumph" might teach us about how to think about the 
relationship between de Man's words and his earlier deeds: that words and 
deeds "coexist simultaneously in an actively intolerable disjunction" (66). 
And this is the political tradition-what Wang calls "the crisis of the Jacobin 
imaginary" (65)-to which de Man belongs. Some readers may feel that 
Wang's reading (which I've necessarily simplified) runs the risk of effec-
tively disabling his ability to say anything substantive about de Man's poli-
tics; others will applaud his demonstration of how excruciatingly difficult it 
is to say anything on this topic at all. 
Wang's chapter on feminism and Romanticism differs from the rest in that 
it doesn't-symptomatically-focus on a single contemporary critic. But in 
its attention to twentieth-century feminism's relationship to Enlightenment, 
modernity, and praxis, and to Romanticist feminists' concern with the poli-
tics of transmission, the chapter forges important continuities between fem-
inist scholarship and the concerns of the book as a whole. Wang continues to 
work out the mutually constituting "excesses" (9) between contemporary 
and Romantic writers, in this case focusing on the missed conjunctions be-
tween Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Woman and the concerns of 
feminist Romanticists. Arguing that contemporary readers may have erred in 
seeing Wollstonecraft as caught up in binary thinking that hypostasizes male 
and female, and in particular masculinity with reason and femininity with 
--..,.-
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passion, Wang details the profoundly anti-essentialist nature of her thought. 
While his close readings of Wollstonecraft are excellent, he does not do jus-
tice to the range of recent approaches to Wollstonecraft in both literary stu-
dies and political theory. Moreover, his treatment of the relationship of 
passion and reason in her work will seem less consequential if contextual-
ized by an understanding of the deeply entrenched place of passion within 
Enlightenment political thought. Still, Wang mobilizes his reading of Woll-
stonecraft to suggest the crucial interventions a feminist Romanticism can-
in addition to, say, recovering the work of women writers-make: its crucial 
role in self-reflexively derealizing the meanings of both "Romanticism" and 
/I gender," its potential to mobilize the aporias of its own acts of recovery for 
a retheorization of both terms. 
Some readers will value Fantastic Modernity for its engagements with indi-
vidual texts, both literary and critical; for others its importance will lie in its 
sustained attention to the elusive, fantastic nature of historical change-and 
hence the shifting understandings of the relation between theory and prac-
tice-within Romanticism. It is Wang's attention to these persistent issues 
that convinces us why and how Romanticist criticism continues to be on the 
forefront of contemporary thought. 
University of Michigan Adela Pinch 
Formal Charges: The Shaping of Poetry in British Romanticism by Susan Wolfson. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. Pp. xi + 344. $39.50. 
What kinds of "charges" are "formal"? We might think immediately of a 
charge to a jury in its deliberations of innocence and guilt, or a formal charge 
of criminal wrongdoing offered to a H charged" suspect. Indeed, we might 
well wonder about the laying of charges and the imputation of guilt when 
discovering that this tome is about form and style in Romantic poetry, and 
poetry of the high canon, at that. What could be guiltier? Susan Wolfson has 
entered a deeply contentious and vexed field in this book, for in it she seeks 
to revisit the old conundrums of poetic form in British poetry and the strange 
history of critical and theoretical responses to the formalist nature of Roman-
tic poetry. This is already a charged ground, explosive in its rhetoric and 
wide-ranging in its apportioning of blame. All the same, in defiance of the 
pervasiveness (as she reads it) of the charge that formalist poetry is complicit 
with the worst forms of ideological co-optation and specious social indoctri-
nation, Wolfson claims to get a charge out of the formal. This is a quiet and 
delightful surprise, and indeed we ought to be even more surprised at just 
how novel it sometimes seems to be: ur want to make a case for the pleas-
ures, intellectual and aesthetic, of attending to the complex charges of form 
in poetic writing" (2). Explain to anyone but another professional literary 
theorist that you need to "make a case" for the pleasures of form in poetry 
and you will be charged with ... insanity. And so Wolfson's careful histori-
cizing of our current state of affairs in this respect is important and welcome. 
II 
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Susan Wolfson situates herself as a critic who seems tired already of the 
old arguments about formalist procedure as bad, bad, bad, and who thus 
wants to get on with the business of reminding herself and her readers just 
why we even bothered getting so excited about the practice of reading in the 
first place. She sets to work actually reading canonical Romantic poems, and 
she does a good job of this. Further, in offering clear-sighted engagements 
with poetic texts, she seeks to "offer this method as theory in action" (1). I 
would question the latter formulation, because there is in fact nothing elabo-
rately theorized about the particular ways in whicl1 she here attends to the 
sounds and textures of form. Her theoretical inveshnents instead rely pri-
marily on a commitment to stylistic and thematic deciphering which, she 
hopes, does not neglect the historicity of the text. In this, her close reading, 
and her defense of it, do constitute an urgent polemic, even a defiant one. In 
contesting, for example, Terry Eagleton'S complaints about lyric as "ideologi-
cally resolvable form," she leaves no doubt about the ground she is staking 
out: "Too many readers today accept Eagleton'S marginalizing, sin1plifying, 
or simply dismissive attention to poetic form as a labour of 'reductive opera-
tion,' an exercise 'preoccupied simply with analyzing linguistic devices.' I 
want to refute the myopia in1plied by 'reductive' and 'preoccupied' and the 
triviality in1plied by 'simply,' by demonstrating how, in the critical perspec-
tives that have evolved after New Criticism, attention to form can articulate 
issues often felt to be inimical: not only the factitiousness of organic coher-
ence, closed designs, and cognitive totality, but also the construction of 
forms in relation to subjectivity, cultural ideology, and social circumstance" 
(19). That makes for a big project indeed. 
Wolfson's sense of form is perhaps overly sensitive to the vulnerability 
faced by all critics seeking to refresh formalist analysis: she is a little on the 
defensive about the historicist valence of the poems she interrogates, and so 
many of her arguments proceed, perhaps inadvertently, as indirect defences 
of the political implications of the text after all. Charged as formal, they are 
largely defended as forms with extra (historical) charge. Still, this is not al-
ways her strategy, and so a fully consistent theoretical stance is not perfectly 
discernable here. I would add, however, that variances in approach of this 
sort are not necessarily problematic, because one of the primary claims of 
this book is precisely that literature ought not to be reduced to oversimpli-
fied preconceptions of context and contingency. Some poems may well be 
merely nasty pieces of ideological work; others subvert their received social 
premises; still others intentionally signal, rather than efface, their suppressed 
historical referents. For Wolfson, then, the work of reading is the work of 
discerning nuance and difference from text to text. 
The first chapter, "Formal Intelligence: Formalism, Romanticism, and For-
malist Criticism" provides an interesting overview of the fortunes of formal-
ist writing in academic criticism for most of this century. Wolfson skillfully 
traces the New Criticism's dialectical engagements with the (old) historicism 
that preceded it, hence rescuing Brooks, Warren, and Company from the 
charge of having blithely ignored all extratextual realities. Further, she 
shows that, for example, "it is important to recognize that Brooks did not say 
that studying poetry refused history and culture, only that the former re-
quired different kinds and sequences of attention" (8). Likewise, she corrects 
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the oversimplified view. that "organic form" is most of the story of Romantic 
formalism, and she cautions against the sentimentalized reduction of the 
poets to silly naifs writing in spontaneous effusions: "Romantic texts are 
more various than monolithic, and their poetic practices are alert to form as 
a construction" (23). 
Thus it is that she studies Blake's Poetical Sketches in terms of a self-refer-
entiality that is also insistently a can to praxis, for his formal practices "are 
actions that call readers to a critical awareness of the work of form, not only 
in poetic but also in cognitive, social, and historical processes" (32). Coler-
idge, the very figure who is most associated with the institutionalization of 
aU the sensitive aspects of form (symbol, organicism, to name only two), is 
studied from the perspective of his use of simile. The simile is a figure that 
advertises its nonidentity with the Signified, and so relentlessly asserts its 
own self-awareness qua (failed) equation. Wolfson's careful attention to Col-
eridge'S processes in this regard enables her to produce an historicany in-
flected rescue: "Coleridge's persistent turns and returns to simile are the 
signature of an imagination always given to reading its world, in various 
degrees, in formations of like and as. And the remarkable boldness of this 
signature is its projection of a formalist criticism worked through the insta-
bilities of organic form and its ideological commitments" (99). 
These are important readings, but here we might pause to ask all the 
same: does Coleridge's remarkable manipulation of simile in fact signify a 
working through of ideology? Here again there is the sign, perhaps, of an 
over-defensiveness, where form is read as a self-conscious way of virtually 
rejecting itself. This is in no way to dispute her careful readings of the politi-
cal and social conditions of poetic economies; it is, however, to open up fur-
ther the question about the relation of poetry to praxis. Wolfson herself is 
wen aware of this potential for defensiveness; in the afterword she does end 
by "urging attention to form not only defensively, in terms of its potential 
agency within and against the cultural regimes that Bourdieu describes, but 
also affirmatively" (232). And indeed, the discussion of Wordsworth's revi-
sions in The Prelude to the "drowned man of Esthwaite" scene certainly does 
escape any critical oversensitivity to the political meaning of formalist work. 
This is a particularly meticulous chapter, fun of careful calibrations of the 
text's manuscript history, though one that seems to privilege the psycholog-
ized subject over the forms of its articulations. 
The chapter on Byron studies his use of the heroic couplet in The Corsair, 
in which the poet's "social existence" is performed in ways that answer di-
rectly to Jerome McGann's oft-cited call for readings that turn aesthetic ex-
perience into self-consciously critical understanding (135). Keats is brought 
forward, especiany in his post-Great Odes phase (in the poems to Fanny 
Brawne), as "moving tluough and beyond this kind of formalism [that of 
Endymion] into an investigation of poetic forms as factitious, temporary, and 
historicaUy situated, thoroughly implicated with systems of experience and 
processes of language that they cannot transcend" (192). The final chapter 
studies P. B. Sheney's The Mask of Anarchy alongside the fmal lyrics ad-
dressed to Jane and Edward Williams. Here we have what is taken to be the 
paradigm for a formalist poetry that is intimately responsive to its social en-
vironment and to the pressures of a deeply felt context, one whose echoes 
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can be discerned even in the intensely private world of the lyric gift to a 
friend. It is worth spending some real lime with this chapter; indeed, in the 
introduction to the book, Wolfson looks forward to showing that "Shelley's 
socially contextualized poetic forms write an agenda for a contextualized for-
malist criticism" (29). 
Whether or not one ultimately agrees that the happiest form is one amena-
ble to contextualist critique, this is a worthwhile agenda, and Wolfson has 
therefore written an important book. Its strangest omission, however, is the 
absence of any full recognition of the pioneering work performed by Stuart 
Curran in his magisterial book, Poetic Form and British Romanticism (1986). 
There Curran sets his attention to somewhat different matters, but much of 
what Wolfson argues will still need to be measured, at least partly, against 
Curran's formidable example. Curran, unlike Wolfson, is interested in the 
full historical and ideological provenance of Romantic forms; a reading of 
the contextuaIized character of Romantic poetry would benefit immensely 
from a dialogue with Curran's work. 
This is not to suggest that Wolfson has not written an original and engag-
ing study. Her call for a refreshed look at nuance and detail, and her exam-
ple of a loving engagement with the texts we spend our lives with, will be 
with us, I hope, for a long time. 
University of Tom11/o Karen A. Weisman 
Urban Verbs: Art and Discourse of American Cities by Kevin R. McNamara. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. Pp. v + 310. $39.50. 
In a time when concern over historical context seems to control the theory 
that drives interdisciplinary methods, it is refreshing to see a work that at-
tempts to deal with the importance of space as well as that of time. McNa-
mara's work investigates the city-in most cases New York-not as a setting, 
but as a kind of protagonist. The city is not reduced to being simply a place 
where things happen, but the city, in its own right, "happens." The city ef-
fects change, creates tension, embodies contradiction. Through an investiga-
tion of literary and visual texts, the author reveals and explores the "conflicts 
that careful discursive arguments conceal" (5). By highlighting the complex-
ity and confusion inherent in urban cultural space, we may begin to explore 
how cities make material certain discourses of agency. Cities are not just 
places in which humans interacti they are spaces which, having been con-
structed within a context of particular discourses, come to embody, main-
tain, and challenge these discourses in ways that affect cultural experience. 
The book's six chapters are paired in such a way that the first chapter of 
each couple provides an example of a text in which conflict has been con-
cealed. The second chapter of each paired set illustrates "an understanding 
of the uses of the apparent disorder [in urban space 1 and a recognition of the 
often unconscious negotiation of difference" (6). Rather than being set up as 
three binary oppositions, then, each case explores a particular aspect of the 
materiality of the city. The first pairing provides two perspectives on New 
l--
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York at the tnm of the centnry. Henry James's The American Scene is cited for 
being "traversed by nostalgia," unable to grant any positive slant to the 
changes being brought about by the polyphonic effects of the influx of immi-
grants and the shift in power structure from old money to new money. Theo-
dore Dreiser's Sister Carrie, however, recognizes and attempts to deal with 
the complexities of a polyphonic urbanism by using the discourses of social 
science to illustrate the tension "between inevitability and intervention" (76). 
McNamara nods to the topic of gender in the second pairing through an in-
vestigation of how language genders not only people but place and space. In 
his architectural renderings in The Metropolis of Tomorrow, Hugh Ferriss's 
drawings illustrate the notion of the "Ferrissian womb," the menta] space of 
the architect where pure ideas are conceived and from which they are born. 
In contrast, the means by which William Carlos Williams represents the con-
cept of marriage in his urban epic, Paterson, If gives the poem a new geogra-
phy," one that displaces marriage with dissonance (168). The final pairing 
presents the human population as integral to the life of the city. The nair 
film The Naked City (directed by Jules Dassin) adequately presents the viewer 
with the violence and chaos of the city's underside, but in being presented as 
only one of "eight million stories," the viewer can relax and enjoy the closure 
provided by the singling out of this story as an anomaly. On the other hand, 
the poslrnodem buildings of Robert Ventnri and Denise Scott Brown provide 
us with examples of how to understand that the eight million possible sto-
ries are always under "(re)construction" (210) and that closure never really 
exists in urban space. 
Perhaps more interesting than each particular textual investigation is how 
the form of the book reinforces the argument that agency lies within conflict, 
within complexity. This idea opposes the strand of Marxist thought which 
conceives of power as being seated squarely within the superstructure. For 
the base to effect any change whatsoever, an all-out revolution is required. 
The problem with this logic is that it denies power to any group that has not 
claimed agency in the same manner as the hegemony. In such a view of he-
gemony, power can be neither indecision, conflict, nor complexity; it is deci-
sion, resolution, and simplicity. McNamara illustrates that, on the contrary, 
power can ofte.n reside within complexity; the works of Dreiser, Williams, 
Ventnri, and Scott Brown highlight this point. It is in works that allow the 
city an agency by means of negotiation between and among competing dis-
courses, rather than in those that illustrate a Jamesian nostalgia for simplicity 
and truth, that we may begin to envision the power of conflict and complex-
ity. 
Two concepts invite this text into a larger academic conversation: those of 
space and of the subaltern. If Foucault has written that "it may be space 
more than time that hides consequences from us," an investigation into the 
"city as protagonist" is an excellent way to situate power within the city and 
to uncover meanings hidden by specific discourses, those of "time" and "his-
tory" to name only two. Unfortunately, neither the texts that are meant to il-
lustrate closure, nor those chosen to provide examples of conflict, are 
approached any differently in the way they are read. Formalist textnal analy-
sis, which pays attention to character development, language, form, shading, 
and plot, and soon, overshadows the subject of the book: the city. Despite 
p 
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the author's claims that this work presents the city as protagonist, the city as 
agent is often lost in argulnents about Carrie's motivation or Williams's use 
of language. 
This is not to say that there is no evidence here of the city as an agent of 
power. When the book works with the notions of space, it joins with the re-
cent work of scholars such as Edward Soja and Derek Gregory. Soja's Post-
modem Geographies and Gregory's Geographical Imaginations emphasize the 
importance and power of actual, physical space as the site for material rheto-
ric. Following their work, McNamara's chapter "Building Culture" examines 
the shift in architectural styles in terms of changes that came about as the 
United States experienced an increase in the numbers of wealthy citizens. 
This new money did not, however, wish to emulate the behavior of old 
money and remain behind closed doors in private homes, sequestered and 
hidden; as a result, the country club and luxury hotel found their way into 
urban culture. McNamara regards these spaces as physical manifestations of 
beliefs and desires, permitting the reader to see how the materiality of the 
building, not simply its depiction in literature (or even in renderings), takes 
part in the discourse of the city. 
Subaltern power, as discussed by Gayatri Spivak, may be thought of as the 
power and agency claimed by the oppressed. Instead of being at the mercy 
of hegemonic power, the oppressed are viewed as having agency that stems 
from their particular position and intimate knowledge of their place in soci-
ety. While Spivak's work remains specific to colonial India, her ideas apply 
to the context of other minority groups or peoples that are generally consid-
ered lacking in political and social power. Urban Verbs insightfully presents 
complexity and conflict as an indication of the presence of power, but rarely 
is the power located in physical buildings or in relation to oppressed or 
dominated groups. This lack has much to do with the subject matter of the 
book, which is not a work on race, class, or gender, as noted in McNamara's 
preference for texts about New York City rather than texts that are of New 
York City. He investigates works that embody hegemonic power (The Ameri-
can Scene, hotels, country clubs, and skyscrapers), but does not give voice to 
works that embody the subaltern power to which he alludes (tenements, 
graffiti, immigration records or journals, and so on). Even so, his work pro-
vides a set of blueprints for a potentially exceptional theoretical idea: that 
the conflict and complexity noted in the relationship between hegemonic 
spaces and oppressed peoples may indeed reveal a site of subaltern power. 
In theorizing the materiality of space, rather than its representation, we 
indeed open ourselves to being able to observe people, places, and things 
that are often rendered invisible, silent, and unknowable. Howeverf many 
questions remain. To whom does the city speak? Are we all capable of un-
derstanding her language? It seems that though we are able to explore the 
complexities of material rhetoricf we do not yet have a language to describe 
nonlinguistic material discourse. We may also encounter an ethical dilemma 
in our desire to uncover the sites of subaltern power: in the act of examiningf 
and thereby exposingf subaltern powerf will we not be culpable of rendering 
such power impotent? Perhaps, if the subject is the subaltern of the present, 
we may. In turning our attention to those subjects as historicat howeverf 
such investigation provides not only an expanded understanding of certain 
Criticism, Vol. XL, no. J: Book Revicws 157 
historical moments, but also the means by which we may begin to disc()\'l'r 
how materiality and the subaltern speak. UrlJaIl Verbs deals with historic,ll 
texts. It is in a contextualized history that the subject of space may indced 
gain ground as a relevant site for scholarly investigation. 
\VaYlle Siale UllivCI"sity Amy K. ivt. Hawkins 
Postcards frolll fhe Trcllchcs: Ncgofialil1S Ihc Spacc /lcfweclI A10demisIII nlllt Ih(' 
Firsl VI/orIn \"Iar by Allyson Booth. NeVI' York: Oxford Univcrsity Prcss, 1996. 
Pp. x + 186. $35.00. 
Nearly all literary criticism of the First World War contends, either di-
rectly or indirectly, vl/ith Paul Fussell's classic account in The Creal 'Var alld 
Modem At/emory (London: Oxford University Press, 1975). Indeed, the status 
of Fussell's thesis in studies of the war can hardly be overstated: although in 
rare cases critics do dispute Fussell's argument that "there seems to be nne 
dominating form of modern understanding; that it is essentially ironic; and 
that it originates largely in the application of rnind ,md memory to the 
cvents of the Great VVar," modernist scholars on the \vhole have (Iccepted as 
a premise the Fussellian notion of a constitutive relation between the deep, 
conceptual trauma wrought by the war and the fragmentary, disorienting 
nature of high modernism. (Two recent critics, however, have provnci1tivl'ly 
challenged important aspects of Fussell's thesis, Adrian Ci1esar argues tlul 
the conventional re(lding of \'\'ilfred 0\'1'1211, Siegfried Sasso on, (lnd Robert 
Graves as antiwar poets fails to account for the valorization of violence and 
suffering in their poetry; he thus places these ci1nonical figures i1longsidl' 
Rupert Brooke (rather than in opposition to the pi1triotic poet) (IS proponL'nts 
of i1 troubling and angry 111i1sculinity; TakillS It Like a hlall: SlI/fcrill,\!" Sr:nwfi-
11/, alld flit' \Val' Pods (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 199.3). Joanna 
13nurke contesls Fussell's Cli1i111 that a l1"'1isogynistic and alienated sensibility 
reigned among soldiers and veterans. For Bourke, the vasl l1li1jority of fight-
ing Illen continued to hold esscnti.Jlly traditional notions of gender and S(l-
ci,lI organizi1tion, tlnd were ci1gcr to rebuild their domestic eslablishnll'1lts 
along conventional lines; Dislllell/herillX Ille Male: Mell's Bodies, Britaill, tlllt! lilt" 
Grcol \ Vllr (Chic.1g0: Uni\'crsity of Chicago Press, 1996). Such <111 apprn<1ch In 
llH1lkrni:-;1ll stresses (orilla I i1nd thematic departures fmlll lill'r.1ry Ir,lditinll 
(\\·hal S,l1l1111:,1 Hynes, in his encyclopedic study of the W.1r i11ld English cul-
ture, describes .1:-; i1 rupture with the ptlst; /\ \Var IIIIIlSillcr!: Til,' rir.~1 \\'(Irld 
\\'111" 1111r1 EII~lis'l Culturc (Londtlll: Bodle,' HCJd, 1990). gl'ner,llh- '·,ll(lrizl'~ tIll' 
11ll1dernist ~tleillpt I() elllbr.1cc idl'as oj· fracture and ~iissnn'"'IllCl\ ,1Ild Il'!ld~ 
ttl\\",uds an inkgr,ltin' and s,'nthctic 111odl'l of mndl'rnism th.11 mlnimizc ... 
diffl'fl'nCt':' .1nH)I~g \\·ritL'f:' (nf'natioll. gL'ndl'r, .lnd cl.1S~. f()r inst,1J1l'l'j. \\\\ft·-
\1\·\'f. nitics "'ho pl.1Cl' thl' \,·,lr ,11 tIll' cru\: of.1 IlWdlTlli~t ~l'n~ibiJit~· t~Til·.llly 
dl'l'mrh,1Sii'"t' tilt' ~tlCi,11 ,1n(\ Jitl'rary Uphl'.1\·,11." pf thl' turn nl" tIlt' Ct'ntur}', 
dtl'l-ti\"l'I~' minimil"ing thl' imptlrt,11Kl' Itlr liter.lr:: ChflllWI(l~~y pI ... ueh fl)~l1rI·'" 
.1S \\·i1dc, CI)nr.ld, ,1Ild I.lI11l's. ,md PI' Ihl' sl',-u,11 .1nd (1.1 ....... pllli!ic,- "I :11\' 1"'-
rill.l ,Hllllnd lOOll. 
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Allyson Booth's Postcards from the Trenches: Negotiating the Space between 
Modernism and the First World War embraces this tradition, and can be read as 
an amplification and expansion of Fussell's thesis: her essential argument is 
that "the Great War was experienced by soldiers as strangely modernist and 
that modernism itself is strangely haunted by the Great War" (6). If the stan-
dard notion of modernism situates the war as a crucial watershed event, 
Booth's study goes further, arguing that the defining formal and thematic el-
ements of modernism derive directly from a conceptual reorientation 
brought on by the war. Booth recognizes that many critics credit the war 
with establishing a certain mood or aura within modernist texts, yet she de-
picts these accounts as "hazy" (139) and over-general, inattentive to the spe-
cific and profound ways in which the war destabilized systems of thought 
and language. In place of a general description of postwar sensibility, then, 
Booth offers a detailed analysis of an array of conceptual problems in war 
discourse-generally focusing on the body in space and time-which she 
then compares with a host of civilian modernist writings. "Modernism ... 
tries to internalize the perceptual and imaginative repercussions of war/' she 
writes, "to transform them into imaginative material and at the same time 
always to point toward the battlefield, toward the physical experience of 
war, and toward the body" (162). Booth's aim is not so much to challenge or 
redirect dominant ideas about modernism as to enrich and illuminate a dis-
cussion that has become relatively commonplace. Thus, if her claim about 
the influence of the war on civilian modernism remains conventional, her 
methodology is contemporary: she studies a broad range of texts and prac-
tices that cut across diSciplinary boundaries, including, for instance, a discus-
sion of both Gennan and English rhetoric surrounding the invasion of 
Belgium; analysis of war memorials; and a section on postwar movements in 
British and continental architecture (the International Style and German ex-
pressionism). 
Booth's study becomes most original----even riveting-when she focuses on 
general categories of thought and language during the war years, pinpoint-
ing the connections between the physical conditions of war and such notions 
as time, space, factuality, and representation. Postcards from the Trenches is 
organized according to a series of binaries, whose very headings indicate the 
freshness of Booth's approach: corpses and corpselessness; encirclement and 
penetration; factuality and unknowability; maps and geographical chaos; 
chronology and the disruption of time; transparency and opacity. In each 
case, Booth discusses a range of contradictions that characterized combatant 
experience on the western front (represented most bracingly in the work of 
such well-known writers as Sassoon, Owen, Graves, and Edmund Blunden) 
and then discusses parallel developments in the literature of civilian mod-
ernists (including Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, D. H. Lawrence, T. S. Eliot, E. 
M. Forster, Willa Cather, Wallace Stevens, and Katherine Mansfield). While 
Booth follows Fussell in focusing on the extreme polarity separating combat-
ant experience from home life, her important move is to credit civilian mod-
ernists with intuiting this very discrepancy, and with attempting to capture 
and explore it in their work. Thus modernism for Booth represents a direct 
engagement on the part of civilian artists with the extreme disorientation 
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and contradictoriness experienced by both combatants and civilians during 
the war. 
As an example, the first section of the book ("The Shape of Bodies") fo-
cuses on the disjunction between the omnipresence of corpses at the front 
and the extreme absence of the soldier's body back at home. In a discussion 
that recalls Eric Leed's influential study of the war (No Man's Land: Combat 
and Identity in World War I [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979]), 
Booth examines the enormously problematic status of the dying, dead, muti-
lated, and often unrecognizable body at the scene of war. As Leed has 
shown, the collapse of distinctions between such ordinarily disparate states 
as life/death, wholeness/fragmentation, and self/other created a psychologi-
cal configuration with long-lasting ramifications for individual combatants. 
Booth is lucid in her discussion of such shifts in experience and perception, 
convincingly suggesting that existential dilemmas surrounding the coher-
ence of the individual self have origins in the material conditions of the 
trenches. Moreover, Booth posits a great irony in the fact that for civilians, 
the war represented a period of extreme (and distressing) removal from sol-
diers' bodies. Far from being immersed in the physical carnage of the front, 
civilians remained entirely separated from the corpses that so dominated 
combatant life; even the ordinary conventions of burial and memorial were 
maSSively disrupted by a war in which bodies were not brought back to En-
gland for interment. Booth argues that this striking loss of innumerable male 
bodies becomes the focus for civilian modernists such as Woolf Uacob's 
Room) and Cather (The Professor's House), who create elaborate architectural 
spaces to house and memorialize the absent corpse. The problem of corpse-
lessness (and its ironic contrast with combatant experience) also dominates 
the development of war memorials. Booth's analysis of these architectural 
monuments-and more generally of postwar debates surrounding the prac-
tice of commemoration-suggests interesting and surprising parallels with 
the bracketed male bodies of modernist fiction. 
Yet there are drawbacks to Booth's methodology. Most troubling is her 
complete devotion to the structure of parallelism (the "just as" formulation 
figures repeatedly in each chapter, becoming mechanical over time): she re-
lies consistently on the notion that the parallels between war experience and 
modernist tropes constitute an important argument about modernism. Thus, 
for instance, in her discussion of A Passage to India, we find repeated-yet 
over-general and unconvincing-assertions of a strong connection between 
war discourse and Forster's primary concerns: "The issue of sexual assault 
stands at the center of both the events of August 1914 and the events in 
E. M. Forster's A Passage to India, published ten years later" (76); "McBryde's 
ominous suggestion that 'these times' require unusual precautions, his pa-
tronizing tone, and Mrs. Callendar's willing retreat to the safety of male pro-
tection were all familiar patterns of relations between the sexes during the 
Great War" (78), "Just as the caves collapse meaningful distinctions by re-
ducing all sounds and all voices ... to mere 'ou-boum/ the war represents 
an ethical black hole for Forster, sucking up possible meanings that then dis-
appear forever" (81). While new approaches to such highly canonical texts as 
A Passage to India are always desirable, the problem here is the tenuousness 
of the alleged connections: the sexual politics that dominate Forster's novel 
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can be contextualized in a variety of ways, only one (and perhaps not the 
most central) of which involves the war. Moreover, to draw a parallel be- '\ 
tween the crisis of the caves and the "ethical black hole" of the war-while 
provocative-seems to raise more questions than it answers about the way 
in which the war's chaotic atmosphere became embedded in a larger cultural 
dialogue, and about Forster's own novelistic appropriation of wartime crises 
in morality and epistemology. 
Indeed, Booth's tendency to structure her argument as a series of allusive 
comparisons at times threatens to flatten and homogenize the literary mate-
rial she hopes to illuminate. If one accepts her premise about the importance 
of the war for modernism's conceptual universe, one naturally wants to 
know more about how modernists transformed, refigured, aestheticized, and 
-perhaps most centrally-appropriated such problems for their own artistic 
purposes. Thus if a text like The Waste Land clearly resonates with the war 
(a conventional point amplified by Booth), Eliot's very thematization of the 
poetics of transformation calls for further exploration. To recognize modern-
ism's indebtedness to the war in this new, full manner functions as an im-
portant starting point, but leaves unanswered crucial questions about how 
modernism both represented and superseded the war's effects. After all, 
what is perhaps most remarkable about the narrative that emerges here is 
the success with which civilian modernists obscured their debt to the war, 
creating their magnificent literary edifice in its very place. As an exploration 
of the way the war ultimately endorsed or authorized modernism, then, 
Postcards from the Trenches remains incomplete. Yet as a discussion of the 
war's role in both destabilizing and creating conceptual categories, and as a 
corrective to an overly deracinated critical approach to modernism, Booth's 
study is highly rewarding. 
Ohio University Sarah Cole 
Science, Jews, and Secular Culture: Studies in Mid-Twentieth-Century American 
Intellectual History by David A. Hollinger. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996. Pp. 178. $24.95. 
David Hollinger's previous study in the history of ideas, Pastethnic Ameri-
ca: Beyond Multiculturalism (New York: BasicBooks, 1995), emerged from the 
mid-1990s affirmative action emergency at rus home institution, the Univer-
sity of California. It was written, Hollinger says, "in the belief that Ameri-
cans need to push yet harder against the authority that shape and color have 
historically been allowed by society to exert over culture" (x). Now, in the 
essays collected in Science, Jews, and Secular Culture, Hollinger considers the 
cultural effects of one such push: the abrupt end of anti-Jewish hiring dis-
crimination on the faculties of America's elite universities in the wake of the 
Holocaust. 
The bare statistic is dramatic enough. Hollinger takes his para~igmatic 
numbers from Dan Oren's study of Yale: "There were a scattering of Jews in 
the university's profeSSional schools prior to World War II, but ... within 
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the faculty of Yale College itself-the culturally strategic core of the univer-
sity-no Jew held the rank of professor until 1946. In that year the philoso-
pher Paul Weiss was appointed .... In 1950 Weiss remained Yale College's 
sale Jewish professor, although by then eight other Jews held that rank in 
Yale as a whole. But by 1960 the transition was visibly underway: 28 of the 
university's 260 professors were Jewish, including 6 out of 95 professors in 
the college .... In 1970, 22 percent of the professors in the university were 
Jewish, as were 18 percent of the professors in the college" (7-8). TI,is demo-
graphic change, Hollinger contends, is worth thinking about as the indicator 
of a change in American culture as a whole: a "transition from Protestant 
culture to pluralism" (21). 
The value of Hollinger's thought here lies in his understanding that that 
cultural change was "mediated .. contingent, historically specific" (15). 
This historical specificity Hollinger explores by documenting it as a history 
of ideas. So, for instance, he aims to help us understand why it mattered for 
the sociologist Robert K. Merton to assert in 1942 that (in Hollinger's words) 
lithe moral values for which science [is] ostensibly a vehicle [are] intrinsic to 
science" (92). Merton's idea that there is a relation between science and de-
mocracy now seems, as Hollinger says, "naive or uninteresting," if not disin-
genuous in its blindness to the relation between science and power (81-82). 
But in 1942 moral values weren't what they are today. If they were compati-
ble with the cultural parochialism of America's universities, perhaps that 
was a sign that they too were parochial. Merton's claim for the universal 
applicability of scientific value was thus specifically political, and specifically 
applicable to history as it was revealing itself in 1942. 
So Merton's contribution came to be one of the classic social-scientific texts 
during the era of Jewish assimilation, and as it effected its changes its own 
language was enabled to change accordingly. In 1942 Merton's essay rode 
into ideological combat under the polemical title of "A Note on Science 
and Democracy," but by 1973, when it had become a part of the textual es-
tablishment, it was "The Normative Structure of Science" (82). For Merton, 
this laying claim to a universal content was the sign of a change more ftmda-
mentally than Hollinger himself realized. Hollinger wrote this chapter of Sci-
ence, Jews, and Secular Culture in 1980 and published it in 1983, but it wasn't 
until 1994 that he learned that Robert K. Merton was born Meyer H. Schkol-
nick (81). 
Science, Jews, and Secular Culture is only incidentally concerned with lan-
guage, but it seems to me to have great value as a textbook of reading. Con-
sider, for instance, Hollinger's analysis of After Strange Gods, a series of 
lechues about literature and culture that T. S. Eliot delivered at the Univer-
sity of Virginia in 1933, published in 1934, and then withdrew from publica-
tion. Part of a single sentence on p. 20 of Eliot's little book has become 
notorious-" reasons of race and religion combine to make any large number 
of free-thinking Jews undesirable" -but for the most part that notoriety has 
issued only in linguistic skirmishes: defensive readings by (for recent in-
stance) Christopher Ricks, counterattacks by (for recent instance) Anthony 
Julius. Read in the context of its paragraph, let alone the context of European 
history in 1933, Eliot's formulation certainly seems vile beyond any defense 
based on words. Hollinger, however, has done the pedagogically correct 
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thing and read Eliot historically, in perhaps the most historiographically sat-
isfactory way since World War II. Such a reading allows Hollinger to help us 
understand that Eliot "was correct to single out Jews, especially freethinking 
Jews, as a unique threat in the 1930s to the realization in the United States of 
a Christian community of the sort in which Eliot-and not Eliot alone-
would have preferred to live" (18). 
That I can now dare to use the word "vile" about one of the greatest poets 
in the English language may indicate that Hollinger's history has gone on to 
a triumphantly happy ending. Grounds for such a hopeful belief are cer-
tainly an ordinary part of American society today. Robert K. Merton re-
vealed the truth about his name himself, for instance, in an autobiography 
which it would have been suicidal to publish in 1933 or 1934 or 1942. But 
perhaps the time will come again when Eliot's way of looking at the world 
has more practical consequence than Merton's. It certainly is true, at any 
rate, that American Jewish inteIlectuals have some reason for their current 
loss of nerve. It's harder than it once was be a Zionist, now that Israel's few 
remaining non-Jewish supporters tend so disconcertingly to be literal-
minded Protestants checking off the countdown to Armageddon. It's harder 
to be a liberal in a time of ethnic self-aggrandizement-especially now that 
there aren't enough Jews left to be worth considering a minority. And of 
course the American academy has plenty of reason for its own loss of nerve. 
Hollinger doesn't see it as his purpose to draw attention to the fact, but the 
American professoriat, as an economic class, is now dying. The figures for 
employment of new PhD.s demonstrate something not predicted by the dic-
tionary: a crisis can last for thirty years. 
In retrospect from this side of the crisis, it appears approximately true that 
Jews ceased making a culturally distinct contribution to the life of the Amer-
ican mind-qun Jews, not just as Americans of the Jewish religion-in 1967. 
That was the year when the New York intellectual Norman Podhoretz pub-
lished his swaggering memoir Making It, but it was also the year when Israel 
committed the unforgivable gaffe of winning a war it was supposed to lose. 
One year later the academic job market collapsed, and neither the commun-
ity of Jewish intellectuals nor the institution where it made its home has 
been the same since. Hollinger's history is therefore unavoidably suffused 
with nostalgia. The book's dust jacket, for instance, is decorated with a 
group photograph of J. Robert Oppenheimer, James Bryant Conant, and Van-
nevar Bush at Harvard in 1948-al1 in black tie, and Oppenheimer in a wing 
collar. Why are they here? A caption informs us: "All were centrally in-
volved in the building of the atomic bomb during World War II, and in post-
war discussions of the role of science in American culture and society." 
Beyond those faclual data, Princeton University Press offers no further ex-
planation. And after all, explanation isn't necessary, because the faces and 
the body language in the photograph say all that has to be said. This turns 
out to be a single \vord, unspoken but unmistakably clear. Twenty years ear-
lier, the word \vould have been Jew, and the picture accordingly couldn't 
h<1ve been t<lken. By 1948, however, the word was simply Power. 
But the process of tr<1nsbtion didn't stop then. Things have changed for 
the Jewish intellectual community since Oppenheimer looked into the lens 
th<lt evening half a century ago, but in Sciellce, Jews, alld Secular Cliltllre you 
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won't find the reasons why. To say this, however, is only to say that Hollin-
ger has written less a history of ideas than a history of events at a halfway 
point. This history carries its subject from scorn to triumph, then ends. The 
second half of the story will need another book to tell, but the half that Hol-
linger has given us in Science, Jews, and Secular Culture is valuable on its own 
terms. 
University of Hawaii at Manoa Jonathan Morse 
German Cultural Studies: An Introduction, edited by Rob Burns. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1995. Pp. xi + 375. $18.95. 
Rob Burns and the other fourteen scholars in German Cultural Studies: An 
Introduction reinforce the Frankfurt School's importance for Cultural Studies 
in charting the liberating and confining functions of cultural institutions dur-
ing the late nineteenth cenmry and the twentieth century in the German 
states. Individuals of various backgrounds, classes, and sexes have con-
structed these vehicles for negotiating values and social identities and thus 
for channeling economic and political power through urbanization and the 
loosening of feudal bonds. 
Burns's introduction sets the tone for the volume as a whole. For him, Ger-
many's late establishment as an industrial and unified state, its fascist period 
after a democratic awakening, and its post World War II restructurings pro-
vide fascinating material with which to test Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno's notions of mass culture. Robin Lenman, John Osborne, and Eda 
Sagarra investigate how, in the case of imperial Germany, the educated mid-
dle class, the Bildungsbiirgertum, coalesces and shapes cultural identity 
through expanding publishing houses, through printing more works such as 
Goethe's Faust, through opening libraries, journals, newspapers, museums, 
and cinemas (chap. 1). Stephen Lamb and Anthony Phelan track the modern-
ist achievements of Germany's middle class in establishing a democracy and 
in supporting the SOcially critical art reflected by the paintings of Otto Dix, 
the plays of Bertolt Brecht, Marieluise Fleiller, and Friedrich Wolf, and by 
the films of Richard Oswald, Leontine Sagan, and Georg Pabst (chap. 2). 
Wilfried van der Will pursues the reversal of modernism's emancipatory po-
tential in the National Socialists' harnessing of technologies of mass commu-
nication (chap. 3). Axel Goodbody, Dennis Tate, and Ian Wallace refute a 
simplistic equation of the German Democratic Republic with the NS-politics 
of Gleichschaltung, or mass control through ideological uniformity, by chart-
ing criticism internal to that state. Two chapters are devoted to West German 
history. Keith Bullivant and C. Jane Rice emphasize the founding of print 
media institutions and the interplay of literature, film, and theory in creating 
the oppositional movement of the 1960s (chap. 4). Then Rob Bums and Wil-
fried van der Will explain the state-subsidized cultural boom in theater, tele-
vision, and education as a sign of the more varied and socially oriented class 
stratification whicl1 West Germany's Marshall Plan-funded economy pro-
duced into the 1980s. Finally, Godfrey Carr and Georgina Paul chronicle in 
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the former eastern states of the unified Germany another media explosion 
which both opened up new vehicles for expression and squelched avenues of 
critique through the financial logic of the Western, capitalist publishing in-
dustry. 
The work of Burns and his authors is related to that of other scholars such 
as Leslie Adelson, Russell Berman, and Rob Holub, who similarly inter-
weave cultural, aesthetic, economic, and political phenomena, but more ex-
plicitly explore the interrelationship between the Frankfurt School and 
Cultural Studies, or the Frankfurt School and Deconstruction, Marxism, or 
Feminism. Holub takes up in Crossing Borders, Reception Theory, Poststructur-
alism, Deconstruction (1992) negotiations of Cultural Studies through the 
transfer of theory between Europe and the United States. Berman analyzes 
individual authors and events from Heinrich Heine to the Gulf War in Cul-
tural Studies of Modern Germany (1993) while exploring the ramifications of 
German and French theory as well as u.s. notions of the political and the 
aesthetic. In framing culture with regards to gender and cultural/religious 
identity, Adelson connects in Making Bodies, lviaking History: Feminism and 
German Identity (1993) notions of body-centered experience in the works of 
recent Frankfurt School-based thinkers like Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge 
and the literary works of Anne Duden, TORKAN, and Jeanette Lander. 
Achieving the broad historical sweep of Berman's book and reasoning as 
Adelson does that Cultural Studies includes the history of underrepresented 
groups such as women, the collection of authors in German Cultural Studies 
has made substantial strides in realizing the goals set out in the 1970s by 
scholars in the Birmingham Center in England and, in the U.s., in the Ger-
man Studies Association and the Coalition of Women in German. Bums's 
group integrates into their cultural history recognition of the barriers to 
women's equal education at the pre-college levels and to their study at uni-
versities (chap. 1), their enfranchisement in 1919 and venturing into profes-
sions considered appropriate for men (chap. 2), the forms which their 
cooperation with National Socialist ideology took (chap. 3), the writings of 
Anna Seghers, Brigitte Reimann, Christa Wolf, and lrmtraud Morgner who 
helped shape and criticize socialism in the German Democratic Republic 
(chap. 4), the efforts of postwar women in the Federal Republic of Germany 
to dear the rubble of bombed buildings, to survive rape by occupation sol-
diers, and to achieve the equivalent of an Equal Rights Amendment in the 
1949 Basic Law (chap. 5), the groWtl1 of the West German women's move-
ment as it was spurred on by the films of Helke Sander and Margarethe von 
Trotta (d1ap. 6), and women's losses through the legal and economic changes 
of unification (chap. 7). 
The representation of marginalized groups other than women is not as 
thorough. While the authors on the chapters concerning the post-1945 Ger-
man states address the cultural history of Southern and Eastern Europeans 
who came to West Germany as "guest workers" and extended their migrant 
literary culture to reach into the literary culture of native-speakers of Ger-
man, they do not acknowledge the Vietnamese and Mozambican workers in 
the GDR, or the Afro-German citizens in the two Germanies. Furthermore, 
this collective has recorded the discrimination against gays and lesbians in a 
cryptic reference to the criminalization of male homosexuality in Paragraph 
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175 from 1871 but not explained the persecution of gays in concentration 
camps as part of the history of nationalism. The development of lesbian cul-
ture in the Weimar Republic and the different sites at which lesbians could 
construct a legally sanctioned public sphere in East and West Germany is 
also conspicuously absent. 
Nonetheless, with its Frankfurt School base, Burns's anthology makes im-
portant strides in telling the stories of nation-building and modernism in 
Germany from feminist and multicultural perspectives. A clear lay-out, a 
manageable list of works for further reading, and an informative chronology 
contribute to an easy read. An invaluable resource, especially after the post-
unification wave of German histories which barely covered gender politics, 
German Cultural Studies clears the way for cultural histories of modern Ger-
many which reflect more upon the country's diverse population in the years 
to come. 
Wayne State University Karen H. J ankowsky 
